This paper argues that the equilibrium business cycle theory that has guided macroeconomics for the past thirty …ve years is incomplete since it can not explain asset market volatility. In the General Theory, Keynes argued that con…dence plays an independent role both in explaining asset market volatility and in determining equilibrium unemployment. In this paper I argue that search and matching costs in the labor market lead to the existence of a continuum of equilibria and I resolve the resulting indeterminacy by assuming that the beliefs of stock market participants are self-ful…lling. The paper reconciles Keynesian economics with general equilibrium theory in a new way.
1 Introduction equations to determine unknowns. As a consequence, there is a continuum of labor market equilibria, each associated with a di¤erent unemployment rate. In this paper, I embed a labor market with this property into a dynamic model with an asset market and I show that the self-ful…lling beliefs of households and …rms about the asset value selects an equilibrium with any unemployment rate in the interval [0; 1].
The value of worldwide assets fell by as much as 40% between September of 2008 and February of 2009, and although the market has since begun to recover, the loss of household wealth was substantial. Macroeconomic models where the equilibrium is uniquely determined by fundamentals cannot easily explain these events because there is no obvious candidate for the source of the shock. In contrast, the old-Keynesian model explains the crisis as a selfful…lling drop in con…dence. I will argue that in 2008 a drop in con…dence caused the economy to move from a low to a high unemployment equilibrium and that this new equilibrium is sustainable as a steady state.
Relationship with Standard Search Models
Peter Diamond (1982a Diamond ( , 1984 pointed out that labor search models often contain multiple equilibria. These multiplicities exist for two reasons. The …rst has to do with externalities in the recruiting process of the kind studied by Diamond (1982b) , Mortensen (1984) and Pissarides (1984) . The second has to do with a bilateral monopoly problem. Howitt and McAfee (1987) pointed out that this second problem leads, not just to a …nite multiplicity of equilibria, but to the existence of a continuum of steady state unemployment rates.
The response in the literature to the Howitt-McAfee indeterminacy has been to argue that the labor search model requires the addition of an additional fundamental equation based on preferences, technology and endow-ments. A variety of candidates have been proposed. The most common is the Nash bargaining solution that allocates rents between a …rm and a worker by assuming a …xed bargaining weight. This solution was widely perceived to be problematic after Shimer (2005) showed that it leads to unreasonably large ‡uctuations in unemployment if the model is driven by productivity shocks.
Following Shimer's observation, a variety of alternatives have been proposed to the standard Nash bargaining approach including low worker bargaining weight by Hagerdorn and Manovskii (2008) , and predetermined wages by Hall (2005a Hall ( , 2005b and Farmer and Hollenhorst (2004) . The predetermined wage approach was developed further by Hall and Milgrom (forthcoming) , Gertler and Trigari (forthcoming) and Gertler, Sala and Trigari (forthcoming) , who added more complicated dynamic bargaining structures to explain the observed sluggish movement of wages in data.
In this paper, I propose a new approach. Instead of searching for a fundamental explanation to close an indeterminate model of the labor market, I close the model with the assumption that …rms produce as many goods as are demanded. Demand, in turn, depends on beliefs of market participants about the future value of assets. By embedding the indeterminate labor search market into an asset pricing model, I show that the unemployment rate can be explained as a demand-constrained equilibrium where the indeterminacy of steady state equilibria is resolved by assuming that the beliefs of market participants are self-ful…lling.
Overview of the Model
In the following pages I will construct the simplest possible model that captures my main theme. It is a variant of a 'Lucas Tree Economy', populated by a representative agent, endowed with a single unit of non-reproducible capital.
2 Output is produced by competitive …rms that rent capital from households and employ workers each period. The main di¤erence from a standard model is in the way I model the labor market by adopting a variant of search theory.
In an approach that has become standard in search theory, one assumes that …rms and workers are randomly matched. Once matched, the wage is set by a Nash bargain. In this paper I drop the Nash bargaining assumption and assume instead that all …rms o¤er the same wage in advance. This leads to a model in which there is a continuum of steady state equilibria. 3 In each equilibrium there is a di¤erent real wage, a di¤erent unemployment rate and a di¤erent value for assets. Every equilibrium is associated with zero pro…ts for …rms but not all equilibria have the same welfare properties. The main idea of this paper is to exploit the fact that there are multiple labor market equilibria to introduce business con…dence (Keynes called this animal spirits) as an independent determinant of economic activity. In the following sections, I begin by describing preferences, technologies and endowments and I show how a social planner would choose employment in each period. I then argue that an informational asymmetry precludes markets from decentralizing this equilibrium in the usual way and that the problem is so severe that it precludes the existence of markets for the inputs to the search technology. Because of these missing markets there is a continuum of decentralized equilibria. 2 Lucas Jr. (1978) . 3 I refer repeatedly in this paper to standard search theory. By this I mean the work discussed in Pissarides (1990) and the more recent developments of that literature surveyed in Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) . In almost all of this work there is a locally unique equilibrium unemployment rate that depends only on fundamentals. A rare exception to models with this property is Hall (2005b) .
Endowments, Preferences and Technology
There is an in…nite sequence of periods and a representative household with a continuum of members. The economy is endowed with one unit of non reproducible capital and, in each period, with one unit of time. The endowments place constraints on the resources available for production that are represented by inequalities (1) and (2):
(1)
I use the symbol K t to represent capital allocated to production and H t to represent time allocated to labor market search. I explain this idea further below. Household utility is de…ned over sequences of a unique consumption good, fc t g : It is represented by the expression
Households su¤er no disutility from work. There are two technologies, one for producing output from labor and one for moving workers from home to work. I use the symbol L t to refer to the measure of workers employed in any given period and U t to refer to the measure of unemployed. They are related by the expression:
which states that if H t workers search for a job, L t will be successful and the remaining U t workers will be unemployed. Employed labor may be allocated to one of two tasks: Recruiting or production. I refer to labor allocated to recruiting with the symbol V t and I use X t for labor allocated to production. The sum of V t and X t is total employment, L t ,
The manufactured commodity is produced from labor and capital using the constant-returns Cobb-Douglas technology
where, by the constant returns-to-scale assumption,
Each period labor must be moved from home to work using a search technology. To keep the model as simple as possible I make the unrealistic assumption that all workers are …red and must be rehired every period. Given this assumption, the search technology takes the form,
The assumption that all labor is rehired every period is a strong one. If I did not make this assumption then employment would become a state variable and the description of the dynamics of equilibria would become more complicated. It is not too di¢ cult to work out what happens in this case but since it complicates the algebra without adding insight, I have dispensed with that complication here. The cost to the …rm of hiring new workers is measured in labor units, rather than output, in contrast to most search models. This innovation to the standard search model is not important and is made for expositional simplicity. The timing of the employment decision deserves some discussion, however, since it is somewhat non-standard. E¤ectively, I am allowing the …rm to use workers to recruit themselves.
Since the …rm begins the period with no workers, and since workers are an essential input to recruiting, it might be argued that the …rm can never successfully hire a worker. Since I will be thinking of the time period of the model as a quarter or a year, this assumption should be seen as a convenient way of representing the equilibrium of a dynamic process. The planner chooses a feasible 4 tuple fV; c; L; Xg and Equations (5) - (8) describes the set of feasible plans.
The Social Planning Problem
The planner maximizes (3) subject to the constraints (5) - (8). Since there is no way of accumulating new capital, this problem reduces to the simpler one of maximizing consumption in every period. By combining the constraints into a single inequality the problem of the social planner can be restated as follows:
This problem has the following solution
The social planner will chose to …nd jobs for only half of the labor force in every period; the remaining half remain unemployed. This economy possesses an optimal unemployment rate of 50%. 4 This is an obvious candidate to represent 'the natural rate of unemployment'and I shall de…ne it as such in this paper. This is a somewhat di¤erent de…nition from that of Milton Friedman who, in his 1968 presidential address to the American Economic Association de…ned the natural rate as follows:
The "natural rate of unemployment," ... is the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there is imbedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so on. [Friedman (1968) , page 8.]
These two de…nitions are equivalent only in an economy in which the …rst welfare theorem holds. I will argue that, as a consequence of missing markets, the …rst welfare theorem does not hold. As a consequence, there is a continuum of unemployment rates that "would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations". If one is looking for benchmark of e¢ ciency, and a benchmark like this is certainly useful, Friedman's de…nition is not much help. It is for this reason that I have chosen to de…ne the natural rate of unemployment to be equivalent to the unemployment rate that would be chosen by a social planner.
Why is there an optimal unemployment rate in this economy? Since search gives no disutility one might expect that everyone looking for a job should be employed. The social planner would not choose to expand employment beyond 50% since adding additional workers to the …rm requires taking workers away from the production of commodities and putting them to work in the recruiting department. Although an employment rate of 100% is feasible as a limiting case, it would be counterproductive to push employment to this level since everyone would be so busy recruiting each other there would be nobody left to produce commodities.
Why the Standard Decentralization Fails
In general equilibrium theory, every commodity is produced by a group of pro…t maximizing …rms. Just as Microsoft produces computer software and Apple produces computers so general equilibrium theory predicts we should see headhunting …rms that operate the search technology to match workers with …rms. The inputs to the search technology are the search e¤ort of unemployed workers and the search e¤ort of …rms with vacant jobs. These inputs should be purchased from households and …rms by competitive headhunters.
The output of the search technology is a successful match between a vacancy and a worker who is quali…ed to …ll it. This output should be sold to a worker-…rm pair once a match has been established. Although we do see some headhunting …rms, they are a small fraction of the employment market and they do not operate in the way that general equilibrium theory predicts.
In practice, those headhunting …rms that do exist operate as personnel departments for …rms that are too small or too specialized to run their own operations. They charge …rms for their services but they do not pay them for their vacancies nor do they pay unemployed workers for the exclusive right to match them with …rms. The markets for the input time of searching workers and the market for the input time of searching …rms do not exist. The most likely reason for this market failure is an informational asymmetry that prevents a worker from credibly committing to sell his or her right to be matched to a single headhunting …rm. In practice, a contract of this kind would be hard to monitor and, as a consequence, specialized …rms that perform the matching function do not exist in practice..
Decentralization Through Search Equilibrium
To replace the assumption of perfect competition, I will assume here that labor is traded in a competitive search market of the kind studied by Espen Moen (1997) . As in Moen's work, competitive …rms take prices, wages and meeting probabilities as given and choose employment to maximize pro…t. In contrast to Moen, I do not allow competition between market makers to set the wage. Instead, I choose the money wage to be the numeraire and I assume that all …rms o¤er the same wage as a matter of social convention. I allow the real wage to adjust through competition in the product markets to implement a zero pro…t equilibrium.
The fact that there is a missing market leads to a model with fewer equations than unknowns in which there is a continuum of steady state equilibrium unemployment rates. This, I argue, is a perfect way of modeling Keynes'idea that there is something di¤erent about the labor market and it allows me to close the model in a di¤erent way from that of standard general equilibrium theory. I close the model with 'animal spirits'by assuming that 'con…dence'is an independent fundamental determinant of economic activity.
A Competitive Model
In this section I will describe the behavior of households and …rms in a decentralized search equilibrium. Later in the paper, I will formalize this idea by de…ning a new concept: a demand constrained equilibrium. Roughly speaking -this is a competitive equilibrium in which all agents optimize, taking prices and matching probabilities in the search market as given.
The preferences of the representative household are logarithmic with discount rate . The household supplies a measure 1 of workers to the search process and, in equilibrium, a fractionq t of them …nd jobs. The variableq t is determined by how many other …rms are searching for workers. I will return to this idea below.
There is a large number of competitive …rms each of which solves the following problem, max fKt;Vt;Xt;Ltg
subject to,
The money price p t ; the money wage w t and the money rental rate rr t are taken as given. In one-commodity general equilibrium models it is typical to choose the consumption good as the numeraire and to set the money price of goods at 1. Here, I choose instead to take labor to be the numeraire and I set w t = 1. I made this choice because it generalizes easily to multicommodity versions of the model.
5
I de…ne the value of aggregate expenditure to be
In Keynesian economics, the value of expenditure is determined by assumptions about the spending habits of consumers and the beliefs of stock market participants about the value of their wealth. Since I choose labor as numeraire, these expenditures are measured in e¤ective units of labor. The variable q t which appears in Equation (14) is taken parametrically by each …rm. This variable represents the number of additional workers that can be hired by a single worker allocated to the recruiting department and it is analogous to the labor market tightness variable in a standard search model. (13) and (14) into (12) and de…ning
Substituting Equations
one obtains a reduced form expression for the pro…t of a typical …rm,
This expression is maximized when
and
Equations (18) and (19) are identical to those that would hold in a competitive model with an auction market for labor. They represent the two …rst order conditions for pro…t maximization. The model I have constructed di¤ers from a competitive model since the recruiting e¢ ciency parameter t is endogenously determined by aggregate economic activity but is taken parametrically by the …rm. I will show below that this externality allows the model to display a continuum of search equilibria each of which is consistent with pro…t maximization by individual …rms and optimizing behavior by forward looking households with perfect foresight.
Search Market Equilibrium
The variables t ;q t and q t , taken parametrically by households and …rms, are determined in equilibrium by market clearing in the markets for search inputs. To see how this works, it helps if we place a bar over a variable to represent its aggregate value. For example, L t is the measure of aggregate employment and L t is the measure of workers hired by the average …rm.
These variables are conceptually distinct although they turn out to be equal in equilibrium.
Using this notation and recognizing that everybody will look for a job, that is, H t = 1, Equation (8) implies that in aggregate,
This equation represents the relationship between recruiters and the number of workers hired in the economy as a whole. Each individual …rm assumes instead that the following relationship holds between its own recruiting e¤ort V t and the number of workers that it can hire,
If we impose the symmetric equilibrium assumption, L t = L t and V t = V t , it follows that q t is related to aggregate employment by the expression
and t is determined by the expression,
Equation (23) de…nes a term, t ; which looks like a productivity shock but is in fact a recruiting externality. I will de…ne equilibrium more carefully below but some intuition may be helpful at this point.
I will show that there exists a continuum of labor market equilibria. In a high unemployment equilibrium, …rms allocate a small fraction of their workforce to recruiting. The productivity of a recruiter is high because all other …rms also allocate a small fraction of employed workers to recruiting. It's like …shing in a pond full of …sh (searching workers) when there are very few other …shermen (recruiters from other …rms). In a high unemployment equilibrium, t is high and the real wage is high but employment is low.
In a low unemployment equilibrium, …rms allocate a large fraction of their workforce to recruiting. The productivity of a recruiter is low because all other …rms also allocate a large fraction of their workforce to recruiting. In a low unemployment equilibrium, t is low and the real wage is low but employment is high.
Asset Pricing
I have described how the labor market works. This section explains how it is connected to the asset markets.
I begin by describing equilibrium choices by the household. Since the household has logarithmic preferences, it will choose to consume a …xed fraction of its wealth. Wealth consists of the value of the household's capital, its income from current dividends, and the net present value of human capital.
If we de…ne p k;t to be the price of a unit of capital and h t to be the present value of labor income then, in equilibrium, the value of consumption in wage units is given by the expression,
I now turn to relationship between consumption expenditure and the stock price.
6 It follows from the assumption of no riskless arbitrage opportunities that the asset price p k;t solves the pricing equation
where Q t+1 is the nominal pricing kernel and rr t+1 is the dividend (equal to the rental rate) paid on a unit of capital.
Since the …rm is competitive and there is a single unit of capital it follows from Equation (18) that the rental rate is proportional to consumption,
and, since preferences are logarithmic, the pricing Kernel Q t+1 is given by the expression
Combining Equations (25), (26) and (27) it follows that expenditure on consumption goods (equal to gdp in this economy) is proportional to the asset price,
where the constant of proportionality, is given by the expression,
There are two ways of interpreting Equation (28). The traditional way is to treat it as an equation that determines the asset price p k;t in terms of fundamentals. In Keynesian economics, the view that I will take in this paper, this equation works the other way around. Beliefs about the value of the stock market, represented here by p k;t , determine wealth and wealth determines aggregate expenditure. Given the value of aggregate expenditure, there is a self-ful…lling equilibrium which consists of a price level an unemployment rate and a physical quantity of real output that makes the belief about the value of the asset self-ful…lling.
In classical economics, all movements in stock prices are driven by fundamentals. If Microsoft shares drop in value it is because rational investors anticipate that Microsoft's pro…ts will fall. Perhaps there is a new competitor in the market. Perhaps there is a new invention that makes the personal computer obsolete. But there is no room for what Alan Greenspan called irrational exuberance and Keynes called animal spirits.
If fundamentals are strong, there will be low unemployment. Pro…ts and dividends will be high and …rms will be able to invest in new factories and machines to fund future growth. Rational forward looking households will make an unbiased forecast of the future strength of the economy and they will bid up the value of stocks to keep pace with the forecast rate of economic growth.
If the fundamentals are weak, there will be high unemployment. Pro…ts and dividends will be low and …rms will not have the inclination or the resources to invest in new factories and machines. Rational forward looking households will correctly forecast that future pro…ts will be low and they will bid down the value of stocks in line with their forecast of a period of contraction in real economic activity. This is the classical view of the role of the stock market in the real economy.
In Keynesian economics, individuals do not buy and sell shares because they believe that their fundamental values have changed. They buy and sell shares because they think that other people will value them more or less in the future. When households remain pessimistic for a long period of time, they undervalue the stock market. If this pessimism persists, it will cause some households to reduce their purchases of consumption goods. Those households that are beginning their retirement will …nd that they are unable to fund the same standard of living that they had expected and they will live in smaller houses, reduce spending on new cars and purchase fewer restaurant meals. Younger households who are saving for college or to buy a home will choose a cheaper vacation in order to replenish their savings. Firms will be unable to sell all of the goods they produce and will lay o¤ workers. As pro…ts fall, the makers of consumer goods will be unable to pay for new factories and machines and orders for investment goods and raw materials will drop. Dividends, pro…ts and investment will all fall and the initial pessimistic view of the future will become self-ful…lling. This is the Keynesian view of the importance of the stock market to the real economy.
Demand Constrained Equilibrium
This section provides a formal de…nition of equilibrium based on the ideas sketched out above. I will appropriate a term, demand constrained equilibrium, that was used by Jean Pascal Benassy (1975) , Jacques Dreze (1975) and Edmond Malinvaud (1977) in a literature on …xed-price economics that was developed in the 1970s. Although …xed-price models with rationing of the kind studied by these authors are sometimes called demand constrained equilibria; that is not what I mean here. Instead I will use the term to refer to the equilibrium of a particular kind of competitive search model. The common heritage of both usages of demand constrained equilibrium is the idea of e¤ective demand from Keynes'General Theory.
In this paper I am going to mean something very speci…c by 'con…dence'. I will use the term interchangeably with 'animal spirits' and I will assume that con…dence determines what Keynes called the 'state of long term expectations'. The state of long-term expectations is a self-ful…lling sequence of beliefs about asset prices. Before de…ning equilibrium I will need to be clear about which beliefs are permissible and which are not. I will allow agents to form any non-stationary sequence of beliefs about the price of the asset provided these beliefs are bounded above in a way that is consistent with the existence of equilibrium.
De…nition 1 A (bounded) state of (long-term) expectations is a non-negative sequence fp k;t g 1 t=1 with a bound B such that p k;t < B for all t.
According to this de…nition, the state of expectations is a sequence of beliefs about the value of capital in all future periods. In a more general model, there will be a di¤erent sequence of beliefs for every type of reproducible capital and discrepancies between expectations and the interest rate will cause changes in investment expenditures. In this model I am abstracting from investment spending by assuming that there is a unique non-reproducible capital good. Even in this simple environment changes in beliefs about the value of capital will have an e¤ect on expenditure since long-term expectations in ‡uence wealth which, in turn, in ‡uences consumption.
The following de…nition is of a demand constrained equilibrium. Following this de…nition, I derive expressions for aggregate variables.
De…nition 2 (Demand Constrained Equilibrium) For any bounded state of expectations fp k;t g 1 t=1 a demand constrained equilibrium (DCE) is a sequence of rental rates frr t g 1 t=1 a sequence of prices fp t g 1 t=1 set of quantity sequences fc t ; X t ; V t ; L t g 1 s=t and a pair of sequences of numbers fq t ; q t g 1 t=1 , such that the following equations hold for all t = 1; : : : 1: 1) Feasibility and Market Clearing. ;
2) Consistency with optimal choices by …rms and households.
3) Search market equilibrium:q
Equations (30)- (32) de…ne technologies, adding up constraints and market clearing conditions. Equations (33) and (34) are …rst order conditions that de…ne solutions to individual optimizing problems and (35) and (36) represent the conditions for consistency of the social and private search technology in a search market equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (DCE) There exists a unique Demand Constrained Equilibrium for every state of expectations with bound
In a DCE, for t = 1; : : :, aggregate consumption expenditure, aggregate employment and the rental rate are described by Equations (37)-(39),
The physical quantity of the consumption good produced is given by the equation
and the price in wage units by the expression
Proof. See Appendix A. What should one make of this proposition? I am advancing the concept of a demand constrained equilibrium as an alternative paradigm to the real business cycle model in which all movements in economic activity are caused by fundamental shocks to preferences, endowments or technology. Although these shocks might also matter in the model I have described, it is also possible for con…dence to have a separate self-ful…lling in ‡uence on economic activity. In this way I am able to understand the relationship between the asset markets and the labor market in a way that provides an internally coherent explanation of the 2007-2009 …nancial crisis. My explanation is distinct from both classical economics and new-Keynesian economics. It explains what caused the crisis -a drop in con…dence -and why we should be actively try to end it.
If the economy remains arbitrarily far from the planning optimum for a long period of time, the welfare cost of a deep recession is potentially huge. In contrast, both classical and new-Keynesian theories describe business cycles as small deviations from a social optimum and, in both accounts, the welfare costs of a recession are second order. 
Conclusion
In modern market economies it is costly to match unemployed workers with vacant jobs. Because there are no markets for the search time of unemployed workers or the search time of corporate recruiters, free market economies do not provide the necessary price signals to ensure that a given number of jobs is …lled in the right way. Because the relevant price signals are missing, a market economy can become stuck in an equilibrium with a high unemployment rate. There are many such equilibria and almost all of them are socially ine¢ cient.
Firms decide how many workers to hire based on the demand for the goods that they produce. The demand for goods depends on wealth. Every di¤erent equilibrium unemployment rate is associated with a di¤erent set of prices for factories and machines and the value of these physical assets depends on what market participants think they will be worth in the future.
The world economy, in 2008, was headed rapidly towards a high unemployment, low wealth equilibrium. The move to this bad equilibrium was triggered by a loss of con…dence in the value of assets, backed by mortgages in the US subprime mortgage market. The inability to value these assets led to an ampli…cation of the crisis as panic hit the global …nancial markets. Even though the US stock market may be appropriately valued based on historical price earnings ratios -investors may also be rationally concerned that the value of stocks could fall further. Variations in the level of con…-dence are manifested in changing risk premia that are fully rational given the unpredictable behavior of future traders in the asset markets. Recognizing the nature of a problem is a …rst, and necessary step, towards …nding its solution. I hope, in this paper, to have made a contribution to this …rst step.
A Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The proof of existence is constructive. Since labor supply is bounded above by 1, and since, in a DCE, L t = bC t , from Equation (19), C t is bounded above by b 1 . The asset pricing equations, (25)-(27) can be combined to give
Using Equation (26) and rearranging terms,
which can be iterated forward to obtain the expression 1 C t = a p k;t 1 + + 2 ::: :
Since 2 (0; 1) and
the in…nite sum on the RHS of (44) converges to (1 ) 1 . Rearranging this expression then leads to Equation (28). Since C t is bounded above by b 1 , it follows that a valid equilibrium requires
Equation (38) follows from (19) and (39) follows from combining (26) with (37). To obtain Equation (40), note that the production function can be written, in reduced form, as
and it follows from (23) and (19) that
Combining these expressions gives
which is (40). To obtain (41) note that
which can be rearranged to give (41).
